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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STEVEN RAY JAMES,

:

Petitioner/Appellant,

:

v.

:

HENRY GALETKA, Warden,

:

Respondent/Appellee.

Case No. 960767-CA

Priority No. 3

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Petitioner appeals the dismissal of the petition he filed
pursuant to rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 65B (R. 18384).

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §

78-2a-3(f) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court properly excuse petitioner's

untimely filing where the trial court applied the exception to
the applicable statute of limitations in a way that effectively
nullified the statute?
The timeliness of a cause of a action under the applicable
statute of limitations presents a question of law.

Gramlich v.

Munsey. 838 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1992).
2.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that petitioner's

guilty plea to second-degree felony evidence tampering waived his
statute of limitations defense?

Alternatively, did the criminal

statute of limitations bar petitioner's plea to evidence
1

tampering where petitioner agreed to plead to that charge and it
arose out of the same events supporting the original and timelyfiled aggravated murder charge?
Because this issue involves interpreting statutes and rules,
this Court reviews the trial courtfs determination for
correctness.
3.

State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 858-59 (1995).

Where petitioner predicated his ineffective assistance

of counsel claim on the mistaken premise that the criminal
statute of limitations precluded his guilty plea to evidence
tampering and alleged no facts to establish prejudice, did the
trial court correctly reject that claim?
The Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for
correctness and factual findings for clear error.

Parsons v.

Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966
(1994).

The trial courtfs determination that counsel performed

effectively presents a mixed question of law and fact; therefore,
this Court makes an independent determination of the trial
court's conclusions, but reviews its factual findings for clear
error only.
4.

State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) .

Where petitioner never filed a direct appeal from the

trial court's order requiring him to reimburse the county for the
costs of his defense and has alleged no unusual circumstances to
excuse his procedural default?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES
Addendum A contains the texts of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-3 02
(1995), 77-32a-2 (1995), and 78-35a-107 (1996).
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By information dated October 23, 1986, the State charged
petitioner with aggravated murder, a capital offense, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1986) (R. 17, Crim. R.
1A) .l

A copy of the information is attached as addendum B.

On

May 12, 1989, a jury convicted petitioner of capital murder and
the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment (R. 18).
The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a
new trial.

State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991).

Pursuant

to a plea agreement, petitioner pleaded to manslaughter, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1986),
and evidence tampering, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1986) in exchange for the State's
agreement not to retry him on the aggravated murder charge (R.
15-16; Crim. R. 2127-35) . Copies of the plea agreement and
defendant's statement in support of change of plea are attached
as addenda C and D respectively.

The State filed an amended

information to reflect the charges to which petitioner agreed to
plead (Crim. R. 2125-26).

A copy of the amended information is

attached as addendum E.
On September 8, 1993, the sentencing court sentenced
petitioner to two consecutive statutory terms of one to fifteen
years (R. 6-7; Crim. R. 2143-44).

A copy of the judgment is

Although the original criminal record has been made part of
the record on this appeal, it was not separately numbered for
this appeal. Therefore, references to that record will be cited
as "Crim. R." and will cite to the appeal numbers for that
record.
3

attached as addendum F.

The court also ordered petitioner to pay

restitution to the victim1s mother for the cost of burying their
son and to reimburse Cache County $160,000 (id).
Petitioner appealed neither the plea nor the sentence.
On May 24, 1996, petitioner filed a petition for
extraordinary relief (R. 17- 41). The State moved to dismiss the
petition as untimely (R. 54-60).

See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107

(1995) . After a hearing, the trial court waived the one year
limitations period, but concluded that all of petitioner's claims
were meritless and dismissed the petition (R. 177-185).

The

trial court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final
Order is attached as addendum G.
Petitioner timely filed his notice of appeal from the
dismissal of his petition (R. 186).2
STATEMENT OF FACTS3
The historical facts have little relevance to the issues on
appeal.

Briefly, petitioner claimed that someone had kidnaped

his infant son whom he had actually murdered, then led his entire
community on a search for his murdered son until duck hunters
2

The original petition also challenged the Board's
determination of his first hearing date, alleging that the Board
failed to give him credit for the time he had already served.
However, the Board corrected that error, and the issue is now
moot (R. 181).
3

Because the trial court dismissed the petition without an
evidentiary hearing, the State relies on many of petitioner's
factual assertions. For purposes of this appeal only, the State
does not contest the assertions cited. However, the State does
not waive its right to contest any of petitioner's assertions if
this case is remanded for further proceedings.
4

found the infant's submerged body at the Bear River Marina
wrapped in a mattress cover from petitioner's home.

See State v.

James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991).
The Utah Supreme Court overturned petitioner's original
aggravated murder conviction and ordered a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence that a prosecution witness may have
perjured himself.

Id. at 795.

In July 1993, prior to trial, the parties commenced plea
negotiations (R. 1). The State offered to let petitioner to
plead to two second degree felonies in exchange for its agreement
not to retry petitioner on the original aggravated murder charge
(R. 236). The State told petitioner that a single second degree
felony would not be sufficient (id.).
The State initially offered to allow petitioner to plead
guilty to manslaughter and perjury (R. 1). Petitioner agreed to
the proposal; however, according to petitioner, his counsel
discovered that the statute of limitations barred the perjury
plea (R. 224). Consequently, the parties substituted evidence
tampering for perjury as the additional second degree felony(R.
15-16, 224, 236). The State filed an amended information to
reflect the new charges (Crim. R. 2125-26).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

Timeliness of petition.

Although the trial court

rejected the State's motion to dismiss the petition as untimely,
this Court may affirm the trial court's ultimate decision to
dismiss the petition on any grounds, including one that the trial
5

court rejected.
The trial court inappropriately applied the statute of
limitations1 "interests-of-justice" exception to excuse
petitioner's untimely filing.

The grounds on which the trial

court relied sweep too broadly, making the exception to the time
limitation swallow the rule. Moreover, the broad construction
contradicts the narrow construction given to identical language
in other contexts.
2.

Timeliness of amended criminal information.

Petitioner

challenges his plea to evidence tampering, arguing that the
criminal statute of limitations rendered that plea illegal.

The

trial court rejected this argument.
No Utah case has directly analyzed whether a criminal
defendant may waive the protections of the statute of
limitations.

Moreover, other states have split on this issue.

However, the majority of jurisdictions favor allowing a
criminal defendant to waive the statute's protections.

This

Court should adopt that rule because: 1) it recognizes that the
statute principally protects a defendant from having to defend
against stale claims, and that a defendant should have the right
to waive those protections; and 2) it is consistent with the
broad latitude given to the parties in formulating plea
agreements, including allowing a criminal defendant to plead to
crimes that he could not have committed.
Alternatively, the evidence tampering charge was not
untimely.

That charge arose out of the same occurrences on which
6

the State based the original, timely information.

Therefore, the

amendment related back to the original information.
3.

Ineffective assistance.

Petitioner contends that his

counsel performed ineffectively for allowing him to plead to an
illegal charge.

For the reasons argued in Point II, the evidence

tampering charge was not illegal.

Therefore, counsel did not

perform deficiently for advising petitioner to plead to it.
Moreover, petitioner has not argued that he would have
rejected the plea and gone to trial on the original aggravated
murder charge if he had known that the statute of limitations
applied to the evidence tampering charge, or that, had he gone to
trial, he stood a reasonable chance of success.

Therefore, he

has alleged insufficient facts to establish that counsel's
performance undermines confidence in the outcome.

This failure

independently defeats his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.
4.

Reimbursement to Cache County.

Petitioner contends that

the trial court erroneously ordered him to reimburse Cache County
for the expenses it incurred for his defense.

Petitioner attacks

both the statute supporting the award and the procedure by which
the trial court made the award.
Petitioner did not attack the award at the time the trial
court made it and took no direct appeal from it.

Petitioner

fails to identify any unusual circumstances excusing this
procedural default.

Therefore, petitioner is procedurally barred

from raising the claim for the first time in a petition for post7

conviction relief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE "INTERESTS
OF JUSTICE" EXCEPTION TO THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS EXCUSED PETITIONER'S UNTIMELY FILING;
NEVERTHELESS, THIS COURT MAY AFFIRM THE DISMISSAL OF
THE PETITION BY PROPERLY APPLYING THAT STATUTE4
A petitioner must file his petition for post-conviction
relief within one year after his cause of action accrues. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(1) (1996).

Petitioner filed his petition

on May 24, 1996 (R. 17), one year and fifteen days after the oneyear statute became effective.

Id.

The State moved to dismiss

the petition based solely on petitioner's failure to file it
within the statutory period (R. 58-59) . Although the trial court
agreed that petitioner had not filed his petition within the
statutory period, it refused to apply the statutory bar, finding
that the statutory "interests-of-justice" exception to the oneyear period excused petitioner's untimely filing (R. 182). Utah
Code Ann. § 78-35a-107 (3) (1996).5

Nevertheless, the trial court

dismissed the petition on its merits (R. 177-84).
Although the trial court rejected the State's motion to
dismiss based on the petition's untimeliness, this Court may
affirm the trial court's dismissal of the petition on any

4

If the Court affirms the dismissal on this basis, it need
not consider petitioner's other claims.
Petitioner never asserted that he had filed the petition
timely. Instead, he only offered reasons why the trial court
should excuse his untimely filing (R. 66-72).
8

alternative ground, even one that the trial court rejected.
State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 356-57 (Utah 1996). 6

Thus, this

Court may affirm the trial court f s dismissal of the petition
based on the expiration of the statute of limitations even though
the trial court rejected that argument below.
This Court reviews the trial courtfs interpretation of the
statute of limitations for correctness.
P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1992).

Gramlich v. Munsey, 838

The trial court incorrectly

interpreted the statute because its interpretation effectively
nullifies the limitations period.
The one-year statute of limitations governing petitions for
post-conviction relief permits a trial court to excuse an
untimely filing in "the interests of justice."
78-35a-107(3) (1996).

Utah Code Ann. §

The trial court applied that exception on

the following reasoning: 1) petitioner had no actual or
constructive notice of the statutory period due to petitioner's
incarceration; and 2) filing the petition fifteen days after the
statutory period "was not an unreasonable delay" (R. 182). The
trial court applied the exception too broadly when it found that
these circumstances warranted setting aside the statutory bar.
Neither section 78-35a-107 nor any prior appellate opinion
specifically defines what circumstances trigger the "interestsof-justice" exception to filing a timely petition.
6

Nevertheless,

The State filed no cross-appeal in this case.
Nevertheless, the Court may affirm on this basis. "If appellees
or respondents merely desire the affirmance of the lower court's
judgment, they need not, and should not, cross appeal or cross
petition." South, 924 P.2d at 355.
9

the trial court applied the exception too broadly because the
trial court's interpretation allows the exception to swallow the
rule.

See

In Re E.H.. 880 P.2d 11, 13 (Utah App.) ("Utah courts

have a duty to interpret statutes so that they will not be
rendered meaningless"), cert denied, 890 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1994).
The trial court incorrectly relied on petitioner's
incarceration to excuse the untimely filing: nearly all persons
who file post-conviction relief petitions do so while
incarcerated.

If incarceration always excuses an untimely

filing, the statute would bar almost no untimely-filed petitions.
The trial court's determination that petitioner's fifteenday tardiness was "not unreasonable," and, consequently
excusable, similarly negates the statute's effect.

The

legislature has already determined that any delay beyond one-year
is "unreasonable."

Excusing a short additional delay, without

more, vitiates the legislature's determination..
In effect, the trial court's broad interpretation made the
"interests of justice" exception the rule and the statute's
application the exception.

Therefore, the trial court

incorrectly applied the exception to excuse petitioner's untimely
filing.

Id.

See also Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245, 252

n.ll (Utah 1988) (courts have a fundamental duty to give effect,
if possible, to every word of a statute).
Prior appellate interpretations of identical language in
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, also support a much
narrower construction of the interest-of-justice exception than
10

the trial court applied.

Rule 51 prohibits a party from

assigning error to a jury instruction unless that party
contemporaneously objects to the instruction.
51.

Utah R. Civ. P.

However, the rule permits an appellate court to excuse a

partyfs failure to object if it is "in the interests of justice"
to do so.

Id.

The party seeking appellate review under the

"interests of justice" exception must show that "special
circumstances" warrant such review.

Crookston v. Fire Ins.

Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991)(quoting Hansen v. Stewart,
761 P.2d 14,17 (Utah 1988)); see also In re Estate of Russell,
852 P.2d 997, 1000 (Utah 1993).
The appellate courts have imposed this narrow construction
on the "interests of justice" exception to prevent the exception
from swallowing the rule.

Therefore, "special circumstances"

triggering the exception do not include mere procedural defaults
such as failing to take an opportunity to preserve an objection,
Home Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 P.2d 341, 364
(Utah App. 1991); a mere failure to preserve a narrow, technical
objection, Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d at 799; or the
absence of a court reporter when the party made the objection
where the party had a later opportunity to get the objection on
the record, King v. Feredav. 739 P.2d 618, 621-22 (Utah 1987).
The tenth circuit has applied an interests of justice
exception in the context of untimely appeals.
v. Murray, 943 F.2d 36, 37 (10th Cir. 1991).

See, e.g., Seniuro
However, that

exception only applies in the "carefully limited circumstances"
11

where an appellant detrimentally relies on a court action leading
the appellant to believe that he had filed a timely notice of
appeal.

Id.

Senjuro was incarcerated at the time he filed his

notice of appeal.

Id.

He mailed the notice outside of the

thirty-day period for filing the notice and asked for no
extension.

Id.

Senjuro argued that the court should hear his

appeal because he did not receive timely notice of the entry of
judgment.

Id.

Despite his incarceration, the tenth circuit held that
untimely notice of the entry of judgment does not excuse a late
appeal.

Id.

The tenth circuit denied relief because the record

showed that the district court made no statements and took no
actions that would have led Senjuro to believe that he had filed
a timely notice of appeal.

Id. at 37-38.

Therefore, Senjuro1s

case did not fall within the limited circumstances that justified
excusing an untimely filing.

Id. at 38.

The Utah courts of applied a similar limitation to the
"interests of justice" exception to the rule that equitable
estoppel cannot apply to a government agency.

In this context,

the exception to the broad proscription only applies in ""unusual
circumstances "'where it is plain that the interests of justice
so require."1"

Anderson v. Public Service Commission, 83 9 P.2d

822, 827 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted).

In Anderson, the

supreme court noted that the exception only applied when a party
had relied on a very specific written representation from the
agency.

Id.

It refused to apply the exception in Anderson's
12

case because no such specific representation existed.
827-28.

Id. at

Thus, like the federal rule, the exception only applies

when the tribunal causes a party's detrimental reliance.
All of these cases apply the interests of justice exceptions
only in special or unusual circumstances.

This court should also

narrowly construe the "interests of justice" exception in the
post-conviction relief statute of limitations.

A narrow

construction promotes the statute's purpose to encourage
petitioner's to pursue meritorious claims diligently.

In that

context, the exception should only apply when some impediment
beyond the petitioner's control affects his ability to diligently
pursue his claims.7

Cf. Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357,

1359-60 (Utah App. 1993) (one appellant's late filing excused due
to his transfer to a rural county jail and resulting inability to
meet with attorneys; other appellant's late filing excused due to
withdrawal of two appellate attorneys, difficulty contacting new
attorneys, and misplacement of trial transcript excused untimely
filing) cert, denied. 870 P.2d 957 (Utah 1994).

Anything less

defeats the statute's purpose by allowing untimely petitions
regardless of the petitioner's diligence.
A narrow construction of the "interests of justice" language
precludes excusing petitioner's late filing.

Petitioner alleged

no facts demonstrating that anything beyond his control impeded

7

The statute already contains a tolling provision for newly
discovered evidence. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(e) (1996). The
statute then allows a full year to file a petition after
discovery of the facts on which the petition is based.
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his ability to file his petition timely.

For example, petitioner

made no allegations that the State denied him access to legal
materials, that repeated transfers made it impossible for him to
prepare the petition or to mail it, or that a court or anyone
else led him to believe that his petition would be timely.8
The facts on which the trial court relied also do not
demonstrate "special circumstances."

Petitioner argued only that

his incarceration, by itself, excused the late filing (R. 65-72).
As already argued, the there is nothing special about
petitioner's circumstance of incarceration: most post-conviction
petitioners find themselves in the same circumstances.
Similarly, petitioner's fifteen-day delay, while not lengthy,
amounts to nothing more than a procedural default similar to that
rejected as an excuse for failing to object to a jury
instruction.
Finally, the petitioner's allegations and the case's
procedural history establish the true reason for petitioner's
delay: petitioner filed his petition only when he became
dissatisfied with the bargain he struck and his resulting
incarceration term.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that,

during the 1993 plea negotiations, his counsel contacted Fred
Trujillo at the Board of Pardons about the anticipated length of
any additional incarceration (R. 20). Mr. Trujillo purportedly
8

To the extent that the trial court's finding that
petitioner had no constructive notice of the statute suggests a
denial of access to legal materials, that finding is clearly
erroneous. Petitioner presented no evidence and did not allege
anything to support such a conclusion.
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opined that the Board would most likely release petitioner
shortly after his return to prison due to his having already
served six years and eleven months (R. 20-21).
Petitioner then pleaded guilty and appealed neither the
pleas nor the sentence, even though he bases the legal claims in
his petition on facts apparent at the time he entered his guilty
pleas.

To the contrary, petitioner waited to file his petition

until after his February 1997 Board hearing resulted in a 2004
rehearing date (R. 17, 21).
Petitioner's own allegations and the procedural history of
this case establish that petitioner filed his petition late only
because he became dissatisfied with the bargain he had struck.
Indeed, petitioner was apparently satisfied with the plea bargain
until he discovered that he would remain incarcerated longer than
he anticipated.

Buyer's remorse in the plea process does not

trigger the "interests of justice" exception to excuse his
untimely filing.

To the contrary, this case presents exactly the

situation that the legislature sought to avoid when it passed the
limitations period
In sum, the trial court improperly excused petitioner's
untimely filing.

Nevertheless, this Court may affirm the

ultimate dismissal of the petition because, when correctly
interpreted, the statute of limitations barred the petition.

15

POINT II
PETITIONER'S GUILTY PLEA TO EVIDENCE TAMPERING
EFFECTIVELY WAIVED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS' DEFENSE
TO THAT CHARGE; ALTERNATIVELY, THE STATUTE DID NOT BAR
THE GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE AMENDING THE ORIGINAL
INFORMATION TO INCLUDE THE EVIDENCE TAMPERING CHARGE
RELATED BACK TO THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL, TIMELYFILED INFORMATION9
Petitioner challenges his plea to evidence-tampering,
contending that the statute of limitations barred that plea, and
that he could not waive the statutory bar because it is
jurisdictional.

Appellantfs Brief at 10-11.10

The trial court

correctly ruled that petitioner waived his statute of limitations
defense when he pleaded guilty to evidence tampering (R. 183).
However, regardless of whether petitioner could waive the
statute of limitations, the statute did not bar petitioner's
guilty plea to evidence tampering because amending the
information to include that charge related back to the original
information's timely filing.
Prior to retrial on aggravated murder, the State offered to
allow petitioner to plead guilty to two second degree felonies:
manslaughter and perjury (R. 1). Petitioner contended below
that, two days prior to the plea, his counsel discovered that the
criminal statute of limitations precluded his guilty plea to
perjury (R. 224). According to petitioner, the prosecutor and
his attorneys then opted for a guilty plea to evidence tampering
9

This point responds to Point I in Appellant's Brief.

10

The State concedes that the amended information charging
evidence tampering was filed more than four years after the
events on which the charge was based.
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in lieu of perjury (R. 236).

Petitioner agreed to the change and

pleaded to manslaughter and evidence tampering in order to avoid
retrial on aggravated murder (Crim. R. 2127-35). u

Petitioner

did not appeal his plea.
In his petition, petitioner contends that the statute of
limitations had run on the evidence tampering charge, making it
"illegal" to prosecute (R. 24). Petitioner concludes that the
trial court violated his rights by allowing the evidence
tampering charge even though the statute had run (R. 25).
At the motion hearing, the State contended that the criminal
statute of limitations is not jurisdictional, and that petitioner
waived its protections when he pleaded guilty (R. 232). 12

The

trial court ruled that petitioner had waived the defense (R.
183) .
A.

This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that
petitioner waived the statute of limitations when he
pleaded guilty.

Petitioner contends that the criminal statute of limitations
is jurisdictional; therefore, the trial court incorrectly held

n

The existing record does not establish why the parties
believed that the statute of limitations would not bar the
evidence-tampering plea. The statute's plain language clearly
applied to that crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302 (1995).
However, the argument in subsection B may provide an
explanation: amendment to include a crime arising out of the same
events as the crime originally charged would avoid the statutory
bar because the amendment would relate back to the date of the
timely-filed original information.
12

The State had to make this argument without the benefit of
briefing because the State based its motion to dismiss solely on
petitioner's untimely filing of his petition.
17

that he had waived that defense.

This Court should hold that a

criminal defendant may waive the statute's protections in the
context of a plea agreement.
No Utah case has directly ruled on this issue.13

As this

Court has acknowledged in the past and as petitioner acknowledges
in his brief, other states have split on the question.
Appellant's Brief at 13; State v Moore, 802 P.2d at 737 n.9.

See

generally Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, Waivability of Bar of
Limitations Against Criminal Prosecutions, 78 A.L.R. 4th 693

13

The State recognizes that language in other cases suggests
that the criminal statute of limitations is jurisdictional. In
State v. Pierce, 782 P.2d 194 (Utah App. 1989), this Court held
that the State bore the burden of proving that it had commenced
the prosecution within the statutory period. Id. at 196. The
Court reached this conclusion in reliance on a California case
holding that the criminal statute of limitations is
jurisdictional. Id.
In State v Moore, 802 P.2d 732 (Utah App. 1990), this Court
acknowledged that Moore had not preserved his appellate statuteof-limitations argument, and that his failure would normally
preclude appellate review. Id. at 737 n.9. The Court further
acknowledged that no Utah case had considered whether the statute
was jurisdictional, that other jurisdictions had split on the
issue, and that one jurisdiction had held that a defendant had to
raise the statute in the trial court even if it was
jurisdictional. Id. However, the Court never resolved the issue
because the State conceded at oral argument that the statute was
jurisdictional and not waivable. Id. For the reasons argued in
the text, the State improvidently made that concession.
Neither Pierce nor Moore considered the effect of a guilty
plea on the statute of limitations defense.
Finally, the State acknowledges that the statute's mandatory
language arguably supports concluding that the statute is
jurisdictional. See, e.g., State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 582-84
(Utah App. 1992) (statutory prescription of time for filing a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea is jurisdictional due to its
unconditional language).
18

(1990 and Supp. 1997). 14

However, the majority of jurisdictions

favor allowing a defendant to waive the statutory bar.

Id. at

698-700 & Supp. 18-19.15
Moreover, the statute's purpose and Utah cases allowing
substantial latitude in making enforceable plea agreements
support concluding that a defendant may waive the statute in the
context of a plea agreement.

A statute of limitations promotes

finality and protects a defendant from the burden of defending
against stale claims.

Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d

1087, 1091 (Utah 1989) .

However, a criminal defendant may

conclude that the advantages to pleading to a lesser crime that
the statute would otherwise bar outweigh the protections the
statute affords.

Because the statute protects the defendant's

interests, the defendant ought to be able to waive its
protections, especially when it provides the defendant with an

14

Courts that recognize the waivability of a criminal
statute of limitations have also recognized varying circumstances
under which the defendant can waive the statute. Those
circumstances range from permitting the waiver only when the
defendant expressly waives the statute on the record to
recognizing a waiver when the defendant merely fails to raise the
statute as a defense. Id. at 698-702.
15

Petitioner correctly cites United States v. Cooper, 956
F.2d 960 (10th Cir. 1992) for the proposition that the tenth
circuit considers the federal statute of limitations
jurisdictional. However, the tenth circuit did not find that the
statute equated to subject matter jurisdiction and recognized
that a criminal defendant may agree not to assert it as part of a
plea bargain. Id. at 962-63. Therefore, the case does not stand
for the proposition that a defendant may never plead guilty to a
charge on which the statute has already run.
19

alternative and frequently more valuable benefit.16
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized a
defendant's ability to plead guilty to crimes that the defendant
could not be found factually guilty of committing.
Cook, 777 p.2d 1029, 1038 (Utah 1989).

Hurst v.

If a defendant may plead

guilty to a crime that he could not have committed, he should
also have the ability to waive the statute of limitations in
order to plead guilty to a crime that he did commit.
Moreover, a defendant may waive his constitutional right to
a speedy trial.

That right protects interests similar to those

protected by the statute of limitations: to insulate a criminal
defendant from have to defend against stale claims.

Precluding a

defendant from waiving the statute of limitations would elevate
the statutory prescription over important constitutional rights.
At least one other jurisdiction has considered these
principles in concluding that a defendant may waive the statutory
bar to prosecution.

In Conerly v. State, 607 So.2d 1153 (Miss

1992), the Mississippi Supreme Court considered a procedural
situation indistinguishable from the one in this case.

A jury

convicted Conerly of armed robbery, a crime that carried a
minimum mandatory ten-year sentence.
Mississippi Supreme Court reversed.

16

Id. at 1154.
Id.

The

Prior to retrial,

The criminal statute of limitations is also
distinguishable from the mandatory time limits considered in
Price and the cases cited in Price. Those cases found systemic
limitations periods jurisdictional; none of those cases dealt
with periods designed to protect a defendant. State v. Price,
837 P.2d at 582-84.
20

Conerly!s attorney negotiated a plea bargain that would allow
Conerly to plead guilty to simple robbery and assault; the
bargain eliminated the minimum mandatory sentence.

Id.

The

prosecutor executed a new information charging Conerly with
simple robbery and assault, and Conerly pleaded guilty to those
charges.

Id. at 1155.

The trial court sentenced Conerly to

consecutive terms on the two charges.

Id.

Like petitioner,

Conerly collaterally attacked the new charge (assault),
contending that the statue of limitations barred that charge.
Id.
The Mississippi court rejected Conerlyfs argument and held
that his voluntary guilty plea to the assault charge waived the
statute of limitations.

The court reasoned:

Generally speaking . . . the purpose of the
criminal statute of limitations, much like the purpose
behind the right to a speedy trial, is to avoid the
bringing of stale criminal charges. . . . [T]his
purpose is related to determining fairly the factual
guilt of a defendant and not with the ability of the
State to bring charges against the defendant.
Accordingly, it is said that a voluntary and counseled
guilty plea waives one's right to assert a statute of
limitation defense.
Id. at 1156-57 (citations omitted).
Petitioner could and did validly waive the statute of
limitations defense when he pleaded guilty to evidence tampering.
One jury had already convicted petitioner of aggravated murder,
and the trial court had sentenced him to life in prison (R. 18).
Although the Utah Supreme Court reversed that conviction,
petitioner faced retrial for aggravated murder and, if convicted,
a life sentence.

His trial counsel succeeded in securing a deal
21

for petitioner that reduced his capital felony to two seconddegree felonies, reducing his maximum possible incarceration from
life to thirty years (Crim. R. 2127-38).

When petitioner pleaded

guilty to evidence tampering, he waived his statute of
limitations defense in order to obtain the benefit of the plea
bargain.
Petitioner contends that even jurisdictions permitting a
defendant to waive the statute require a knowing and voluntary
waiver, and that he could not knowingly waive the statute because
his attorney did not inform him that it applied to evidence
tampering.

Appellantfs Brief at 13.17 Although the existing

record does not definitively establish whether petitioner knew
the statute of limitations also applied to evidence tampering,
this Court should affirm petitioner's waiver based on what the
record does establish.
Petitioner acknowledged to the trial court that the State
wanted guilty pleas to two second-degree felonies in exchange for
giving up its right to prosecute petitioner for a capital felony
(R. 236). Regardless of whether petitioner knew that the statute
applied to evidence tampering, the record shows that petitioner

17

To the extent petitioner suggests that all jurisdictions
permitting a waiver also impose this requirement, he misstates
the law. As noted above, some jurisdictions recognize that a
defendant may waive the statute merely by not raising it as a
defense. See Annotation at 698-700 & Supp. 18-19. Moreover, the
Mississippi Court recognized that Conerly's knowing and voluntary
guilty plea waived the statute even though the record did not
establish whether Conerly knew that the statute had run on the
assault charge. Conerly v. State, 607 So.2d at 1158 (Sullivan,
J. dissenting).
22

knew that he had to plead guilty to two second degree felonies in
order to avoid the possibility of reprosecution for a capital
felony.
For the reasons argued, the Court should affirm the trial
court's conclusion that petitioner's knowing and voluntary plea
waived any defense to the evidence tampering charge, including
any claim that the statute of limitations barred that charge.
B.

Alternatively, the statute of limitations did not bar
petitioner's plea to evidence tampering because the
amendment to include that charge related back to the
original, timely filed information.

Even if petitioner could not waive the statute of
limitations, the statute of limitations did not bar his plea to
evidence tampering because the charge related back to the
original, timely-filed petition.18
The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure permit amending an
information at any time prior to a verdict.
4(d).19

Utah R. Crim. P.

No rule of criminal procedure specifically delineates

when an amendment to an information relates back to the filing of
the original information.

However, the rules of civil procedure

Indeed, this Court may affirm on this basis without even
considering whether petitioner could waive the statutory bar.
19

The rule permits the amendment "if no additional or
different offense is charged and the substantial rights of the
defendant are not prejudiced." Id. In this case, the amendment
added the evidence-tampering charge. However, because petitioner
necessarily agreed to the amendment as part of the plea bargain
(Crim. P. 2127), he waived any claim that adding the charge
violated the rule. Cf. Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 215-16
(Utah 1993) (failure to object to an amendment or to raise its
unlawfulness precludes appellate review in a petition for
extraordinary relief), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 1050 (1994).
23

govern in criminal actions "where there is no other applicable
statute or rule" as long as applying the civil rule does not
conflict with any "constitutional requirement."

Utah R. Civ. P.

81(e) .
Under the rules of civil procedure, an amendment to a civil
pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading
"[w]henever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading . . . ."
R. Civ. P. 15(c).

Utah

If a new claim relates back to the date of the

original pleading, a party may include it even when the statute
of limitations has otherwise run on that claim.

Rinawood v.

Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah App.)(citing
Myers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879 (Utah 1981)), cert.
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
The evidence-tampering charge arose out of the same
occurrences that generated the original aggravated murder charge.
The original information charged petitioner with the aggravated
murder of his son (R. 1A). At the time he murdered his son,
petitioner wrapped the infant's body in a tarp weighted down with
rocks and threw the body into the Bear River to conceal it (R. 4,
Crim. R. 2-5, 11-13, 2125) .

These facts formed the basis for the

evidence tampering charge (Crim. R. 2125).

Concealing his baby's

body by discarding it in the river formed an integral part of the
originally charged homicide.

Therefore, the evidence tampering

arose out of the same transaction or occurrence which gave rise
24

to the aggravated murder charges.
Sound policy also supports applying the relation-back
doctrine to criminal cases, especially in the plea context.

A

statute of limitations promotes finality and protects litigants
from the burden of defending against stale claims.

Horton v.

Goldminerfs Daughter. 785 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Utah 1989).

The

relation-back rule does nothing to defeat this purpose: because
the added claims must arise out of the same set of occurrences as
the original claims, the party already has notice of the evidence
against which it must defend.

The same is true in criminal

cases.
In this case, petitioner clearly had notice of the facts
supporting the subsequently added evidence-tampering charge at
the time the State originally charged him with aggravated murder:
the affidavits in support of search and arrest warrants, dated
contemporaneously with the original information, both detailed
those facts (Crim. R. 2-5, 8-17) . The affidavits are attached as
addenda H and I respectively.

Furthermore, petitioner agreed to

those facts in support of his plea; therefore, he faced no risk
of having to defend against a claim about which he had no timely
notice.
C.

Petitioner is not entitled to have his evidence
tampering sentence vacated while leaving the remainder
of the plea agreement in tact.

Petitioner contends that the statutory bar should absolve
him from having to serve the consecutive one-to-fifteen-year
sentence for the evidence tampering charge.
25

Appellant's Brief at

10.

Even if this Court agrees with petitioner's contention that

the statute of limitations precluded his guilty plea to evidence
tampering, he has requested a remedy to which he is not entitled.
The evidence tampering plea and resulting sentence arose
from a plea bargain.

That bargain required petitioner to plead

guilty to manslaughter and evidence tampering in exchange for the
Statef s agreement not to try him for aggravated murder a second
time.

If petitioner succeeds on his substantive challenge to the

evidence-tampering plea, the appropriate remedy would be to
return the parties to their pre-plea positions; not to void only
one part of the agreement to make it even more beneficial to
petitioner.

See Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1979)

(dicta) (if defendant is allowed to withdraw his plea, fairness
requires "that the case should revert to its status on the
original charge as it was before the agreement to enter his plea
of guilty"); State v. Gentry. 797 P.2d 456, 459 n.4 (Utah App.
1990) (dicta) (acknowledging return to pre-agreement positions is
the usual remedy, but explaining why it could not be applied in
that case).
In sum, even if this Court concludes that petitioner could
not waive the statute of limitations, the statute did not bar
petitioner's guilty plea to evidence tampering because the
amended information related back to the timely filed original
information.
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POINT III
BECAUSE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DID NOT PRECLUDE
PETITIONER'S GUILTY PLEA TO EVIDENCE TAMPERING, TRIAL
COUNSEL DID NOT PERFORM DEFICIENTLY BY ALLOWING HIM TO
PLEAD GUILTY TO THAT CHARGE20
Petitioner next contends that his counsel performed
deficiently by not raising the statutory bar to the evidence
tampering charge.

Appellant's Brief at 14.

In effect,

petitioner argues that the statute of limitations rendered his
plea to evidence tampering illegal; therefore, counsel performed
deficiently by allowing him to enter that plea.21
In order to succeed on this claim, petitioner must establish
two elements.

First, he must identify the specific acts or

20

This argument responds to Point II in petitioner's brief.

21

Petitioner does not clearly state his argument either
below or in his brief. However, his other arguments and the
relief he seeks establish that he bases his argument on the
contention that counsel performed deficiently by allowing him to
enter a plea that the law abolutely precluded him from entering.
Petitioner contends that the statute of limitations issue turns
on whether the statute is jurisdictional, and that counsel's
conduct prejudiced him because it permitted an additional seconddegree felony conviction and asks this Court to vacate the
evidence tampering plea. Appellant's Brief at 10-12, 14.
Similarly, petitioner has not asked for an evidentiary hearing to
determine what counsel advised him. Therefore, petitioner
contends only that counsel erroneously allowed him to plead to a
charge that the law precluded him from pleading to.
Moreover, petitioner's pleadings below support this
characterization of his argument. Petitioner contended that the
statute of limitations had run on the evidence-tampering charge,
making it "illegal to prosecute" (R. 22). Similarly, petitioner
defended against the State's motion to dismiss his petition as
untimely by contending that the post-conviction relief statute of
limitations did not apply because he was challenging an illegal
sentence (R. 66). Again, the arguments establish that petitioner
contended that the statute precluded his plea to evidence
tampering as a matter of law.
27

omissions he claims fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88,

690 (1984); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert,
denied, 513 U.S. 966 (1994) . This element requires petitioner to
overcome a strong presumption that counsel rendered
constitutionally sufficient assistance.

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. at 690; Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d at 522.
Petitioner's claim can succeed only if this Court can surmise no
conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy from trial counsel's
actions.

State v. Perrv, 899 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah App. 1995)

(""[T]his court will not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate
strategic choices, however, flawed those choice might appear in
retrospect.'").
Second, petitioner must establish prejudice from the alleged
deficient performance.

In the guilty plea context, petitioner

must establish that, but for counsel's error, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d at 525.

In other words, petitioner

must establish that the alleged deficient performance affected
the outcome of the plea process.

Id.

As already established in Point II, the factual predicate
for petitioner's ineffectiveness claim fails: the statute of
limitations did not legally bar petitioner's plea to evidence
tampering.

Petitioner has not overcome the strong presumption

that counsel performed adequately by permitting him to plead

28

guilty to that crime.
Petitioner's prejudice argument similarly fails. He
contends that he would not have an additional second-degree
felony conviction if counsel had pointed out its illegality.
However, because it was not illegal, the factual predicate for
his prejudice claim also fails.

Similarly, petitioner has not

even argued let alone established that he would gone to trial on
the aggravated murder charge rather than accept the plea offer,
or that he stood a reasonable chance of success at trial. See,
e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 59 (1985).

Therefore,

he has failed as a matter of law to establish that counsel's
conduct undermines confidence in the outcome, and that failure
independently defeats his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.
POINT IV
PETITIONER'S CHALLENGE TO THE $160,000 AWARDED TO CACHE
COUNTY IS PROCEDURALLY BARRED23
Petitioner challenges the $160,000 awarded to Cache County.
Although the sentencing court awarded this amount as restitution,
the parties have effectively agreed that it is more properly
treated as an award under Utah Code Ann. § 77-32a-2 (1995), which
permits a trial court to "require a convicted defendant to make
restitution and pay costs,"

including "attorney fees of counsel

22

Moreover, counsel managed to insulate petitioner against
exposure to either a capital felony with a possible life sentence
or even a first degree felony with a five-to-life sentence and
secure for him a sentence that could last, at most, thirty years.
23

This argument responds to Point III in petitioner s brief.
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assigned to represent the defendant."

Id. § 77-32a-2.

Petitioner attacks the internal consistency and the
constitutionality of the statute, contends the amount is
excessive, and claims that the trial court erroneously imposed it
without considering his financial resources.
at 17. 24

Appellant f s Brief

However, petitioner never challenged this award at the

24

Although the State contends that petitioner is
procedurally barred from challenging the award, petitioner's
challenges to the statute fail as a matter of law. Section 7732a-2 permits a court to order a convicted defendant to reimburse
the county for the amounted expended to provide him with an
attorney.
Petitioner claims section 77-32a-2 is internally
inconsistent and vague because the statute provides for recovery
of attorney's fees but not for expenses "inherent in providing a
constitutionally guaranteed trial." Appellant's Brief at 17.
Petitioner argues that the cost of State appointed legal
representation is "inherent in providing a constitutionally
guaranteed trial." Thus, the statute both allows and prohibits
the State from recovering the costs of an indigent's defense.
Although, no Utah case interprets the "costs inherent in
providing a constitutionally guaranteed trial" provision, Oregon
cases interpreting a statute after which Utah patterned section
77-32a-2 provide insight into the phrase's meaning. State v.
Depaoli, 835 P.2d 162, 163-64 (Utah 1992) (borrowing Oregon case
law to determine whether the State can recover the costs of a
code R examination from a rapist under section 77-32a-2). Oregon
courts consistently interpret their statute to allow the State or
a political subdivision to recover attorney's fees from indigent
defendants. State v. Mitchell, 617 P.2d 298, 301-02 (Or. Ct.
App. 1980); State v. Fuller, 504 p.2d 1393, 1396 (Or. Ct. App.
1973), aff'd 417 U.S. 40 (1974).
The statute also permits
recovery for other expenses specially incurred in prosecuting a
defendant. York v. Oregon State Correctional Inst., 651 P.2d
1376, 1378 (Or. Ct. App. 1982)(State can recover costs incurred
in returning a prisoner who absconded to Florida while on
temporary prison leave); State v. Armstrong, 605 P.2d 736, 738
(Or. Ct. App. 1980)(holding recoverable costs incurred
transporting defendant back to Oregon after an extradition
waiver); State v. Hastings, 544 P.2d 590, 590 (Or. Ct. App.
1976)(witness fees recoverable under statute). Expenses not
recoverable include prosecutor's salaries, payments to jurors,
30

time the trial court imposed it, did not appeal the award, and
has alleged no unusual circumstances justifying his procedural
default; therefore, the claim is procedurally barred.
"Habeas Corpus proceedings may be used to attack a judgment
or conviction in the event of an obvious injustice or a
substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right in
the trial of a matter but it may not be used as a substitute for
regular appellate review." Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 804
(Utah 1988)(citations omitted).

"It is therefore well settled in

this state that allegations of error that could have been but
were not raised on appeal from a criminal conviction cannot be
raised by habeas corpus or post conviction review, except in
unusual circumstances."

Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1104

(Utah 1983) .
Unusual circumstances excusing a procedural default include
the discovery of previously undiscoverable evidence or
ineffective assistance of defense counsel.

Bundy v. Deland, 763

police officer's salaries, costs of investigation, and
operational overhead because those expenses are inherent in
providing a constitutionally guaranteed trial. State v. Heston,
704 P.2d 541, 543 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (comparing recoverable
expenses with those that are not); State v. Washburn. 616 P.2d
554, 555 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (sheriff's overtime pay not
recoverable); Hastings, 544 P.2d at 590 (juror's fees not
recoverable).
Case also directly contradicts petitioner's constitutional
argument. The United States Supreme Court has found that
Oregon's similar cost recovery scheme does not interfere with a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Fuller v. Oregon.
417 U.S. 40, 54, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 2125 (1974).
Therefore petitioner's challenges to the statute fail as a
matter of law.
31

P.2d at 804; Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 343-44 (Utah 1980).
Petitioner has never argued, let alone established, any unusual
circumstances justifying the procedural default in this case.
If, as petitioner alleges, the trial court neglected to consider
his financial resources before ordering petitioner to reimburse
the county, that fact was immediately obvious to petitioner.
Petitioner knew that he was indigent and his long term financial
outlook at the time he was sentenced.

If the trial court

erroneously failed to consider those facts, petitioner should
have brought that error to the sentencing judge's attention and
taken a direct appeal if denied relief.

Petitioner does not

allege that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during
the sentencing procedure, nor does he put forth any unusual
circumstances which prevented the discovery of the alleged error
which occurred almost three years prior to the time that he filed
his petition (R. 6-7). In short, he offers nothing to excuse his
procedural default, and that failure requires applying the
procedural bar.25

25

If this Court does not accept the procedural bar argument,
then the appropriate remedy would be to remand this case for an
evidentiary hearing on this issue. Because the trial court
granted the State's motion to dismiss, it held no such hearing,
and the existing record presents no evidence to establish whether
the trial court considered petitioner's financial resources.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the State asks the Court to affirm
the trial court's dismissal of the petition for post-conviction
relief.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED
This case presents two issues of first impression.

First,

it asks this Court to interpret the "interests of justice"
exception to the statute of limitations governing petitions for
post-conviction relief.

Second, it presents an issue of whether

the Utah criminal statute of limitations may be waived in the
context of a plea agreement.
argument in this case.

Therefore, the State requests oral

To the extent that the Court rules on the

merits of either or both of these issues, the State also requests
a published opinion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/? —

day of /l/[n A , 1998.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

THOMAS B. BRUNKER
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, by first class U.S. mail,
postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to
MARK T. ETHINGTON, DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST, L.C, 45 East Vine
Street, Murray, Utah, 81407, this

£• -—'day of Novomber, 199/7.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

76-1-302. Time limitations for prosecution of offenses Commencement of prosecution.
Statute text
(1) Except as otherwise provided, a prosecution for:
(a) a felony or negligent homicide shall be commenced within four
years after it is committed;
(b) a misdemeanor other than negligent homicide shall be
commenced within two years after it is committed; and
(c) any infraction shall be commenced within one year after it is
committed.
(2) A prosecution is commenced upon the finding and filing of an
indictment by a grand jury or upon the filing of a complaint or
information.
History
History: C. 1953, 76-1-302, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, §
76-1-302; 1985 (1st S.S.), ch. 2, § 2; 1990, ch. 5, § 1.
77-32a-2. Costs - What constitute.
Statute text
Costs shall be limited to expenses specially incurred by the
state or any political subdivision in investigating, searching
for, apprehending, and prosecuting the defendant, including
attorney fees of counsel assigned to represent the defendant
pursuant to Section 77-32-2, interpreter fees and investigators'
fees. Costs cannot include expenses inherent in providing a
constitutionally guaranteed trial or expenditures in connection
with the maintenance and operation of government agencies that
must be made by the public irrespective of specific violations of
law. Costs cannot include attorneys1 fees for prosecuting
attorneys.
History
History: C. 1953, 77-32a-2, enacted by L. 1980, ch. 15, § 2;
1993, ch. 238, § 1; 1997, ch. 215, § 13.
78-35a-107. Statute of limitations for post-conviction relief.
Statute text
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is
filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued.
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on
the latest of the following dates:
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final
judgment of conviction, if no appeal is taken;
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has
jurisdiction over the case, if an appeal is taken;
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in
the Utah Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no
petition for writ of certiorari is filed;
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of
certiorari or the entry of the decision on the petition for
certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is filed;
or
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in
the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on

which the petition is based.
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a
court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file within the time
limitations.
(4) Sections 78-12-35 and 78-12-40 do not extend the limitations
period established in this section.
History
History: C. 1953, 78-12-31.1, enacted by L. 1995, ch. 82, § 1;
renumbered by L. 1996, ch. 235, § 7.
Annotations
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 1995, ch. 82, § 1 repeals former
§ 78-12-31.1, as enacted by Laws 1979, ch. 133, § 1, setting a
three-month time limit on the right to petition for a habeas
corpus writ, and enacts the present section, effective May 1,
1995.
Amendment Notes. - The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996,
renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 78-12-31.1;
added Subsection (4), redesignating former Subsection (4) as (3);
deleted former Subsections (3) and (5) concerning applicability
to time limitations and motions to correct a sentence; in
Subsections (1) and (2) deleted "pursuant to Rule 65B(b), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure" after "entitled to relief"; and in
Subsection (2) deleted "in a petition for post-conviction relief"
after "cause of action."

ADDENDUM B

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT

8^K66t>kn

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

INFORMATION

H4-W

STEVEN RAY JAMES,
DOB: 2-27-52

Defendant.

The undersigned Craig Andrews, under oath states on information
and belief that the above named defendant(s) committed the crime
of:
CRIME: Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree
IN VIOLATION OF: Section 76-5-202(1)(h) U.C.A. 1953, as amended,
CLASSIFICATION:
Capital Felony
AT:
Cache County, State of Utah
ON OR ABOUT:
August 26, 1986
The acts of the defendant(s) constituting the crime(s) were:
That the said Defendant, on the day and place aforesaid, did
intentionally or knowingly cause the death of another, to wit:
Steven Roy James, the said Defendant having been previously
convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to
a person.
The information is based on evidence obtained from the following
witnesses: Craig Andrews

COMPLAINANT
Authorized for presentment
and filing:

10-23-86

Subscribed and sworn to before
me this
9 ?
day oj\

Warrant Issued

l/V

ADDENDUM C

FILED tHSTfflCTCCBBT
Third Judicial District

JAMES C. JENKINS #1658
Deputy Cache County Attorney
110 North 100 West
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone (801) 752-8920

AUG 0 2 1993

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

i

PLEA AGREEMENT

vs.
|
]

STEVEN RAY JAMES,
DOB: 02-17-52

District No. 891900667

Defendant.
The Defendant, STEVEN RAY JAMES, by and through his legal
counsel, Barbara King Lachmar and Arden W. Lauritzen, has entered
into plea negotiations with the Office of the Cache County Attorney
which is prosecuting this case on behalf of the State of Utah.
Based on those negotiations, the parties have agreed as follows:
1.

The Defendant was originally charged with the following:

COUNT

OFFENSE

DEGREE

1

Criminal Homicide

Capitol

2.

DATE OF OFFENSE
08-26-86

The Defendant shall enter pleas of guilty to the charges

specified in the Amended Information:

Count 1, Manslaughter; and

Count 2, Tampering with Evidence.
3.

The Defendant shall make full restitution in an amount to

be determined by the Court.

1
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4. Defendant has, with the advice and assistance of his legal
counsel, read and executed this plea agreement and the accompanying
statement of Defendant and has done so willingly, voluntarily, and
without undue influence.
5. Defendant shall file no motion for reduction or charges or
sentencing under the provisions of S76-3-402, Utah Code Annotated,
1953 as amended, and hereby acknowledges that he is not eligible
for such relief.
6.

Defendant waives his right to appeal.

7.

A current presentence investigation report shall be

prepared by Adult Probation and Parole and submitted to the Court
prior to sentencing.
8.

The Defendant Shall comply with the following three-phase

scheduling:
A.
B.
C.
9.

The making of his disclosure statement in open
court.
Entry of plea.
Sentencing.

The Defendant shall waive his right to a preliminary

hearing on Count 2, Tampering with Evidence.
9^ The State of Utah, through the Office of the Cache County
Attorney, has made no promises or commitments as to the sentence
which the Court may

impose

in this matter nor to make any

recommendations favorable to the Defendant for sentencing.
State

reserves

its

right

to

present

any

arguments

The
or

recommendations it deems appropriate in the respect to sentencing.

2
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10. The Defendant acknowledges by signing this agreement and
entering subsequent pleas of guilty as provided that the Defendant
waives his right to trial and appeal and further that a motion to
withdraw the guilty pleas must be filed with this Court within
thirty (30) days of the entry of the pleas.
11. There are no other agreements by and between the parties
than as specified in this agreement unless acknowledged on the
record in Court with all parties presents
DATED this

**— day of July, 1993.

STATE OF UTAH

/ JMESC
§puty

DEFENDANT
>

& ^ A U A

STEVEN RAY JAM

he County Attorney

DEFENSE ATTORNEY

BARBARA KING LACUNAR
RNEY

ZEN

3
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ADDENDUM D

JAMES C. JENKINS #1658
Deputy Cache County Attorney
110 North 100 West
Logan, UT 84321
Telephone (801) 752-8920
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
i

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT

I
]

District No. 891900667

Plaintiff,

vs.
STEVEN RAY JAMES,
DOB: 02-17-52
Defendant.
I, STEVEN RAY JAMES, the Defendant in this case, state as
follows with respect to the entry by me of a guilty plea:
1.

I hereby confirm the entry of a plea of guilty to the

following:
COUNT

OFFENSE

CLASS

1

Manslaughter (76-5-205)

2

Tampering with Evidence
(76-8-510)

Second
Degree
Felony
Second Degree
Felony

2. I have received and read a copy of the amended information
filed against me in this case.
3. I understand the nature and the elements of the offense or
offenses to which I am pleading guilty.
4. The elements of the offenses for the crimes to which I am
pleading guilty:

1
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Count I:

Manslaughter

a.

That I did recklessly cause the death of another.

b.

The crime was committed on or about August 26, 1986.

c.

The crime was committed in Cache County, Utah.

d. My conduct, and the conduct of any other persons for
which I am criminally liable, that constitutes the elements of the
crime charged is as follows:
That I did recklessly cause the death of another, to wit:
Steven Roy James, an infant, by shaking him too hard.
e.

I understand that the maximum punishment by statute

for the offense would be not less than one and not more than
fifteen (15) years in the Utah State Penitentiary and/or a fine not
to exceed $10,000.00, plus a 25% surcharge.
Count 2:

Tampering with Evidence

a. That I did, believing that an official proceeding or
investigation was pending

or about

to be

instituted, alter,

destroy, conceal and/or remove something with a purpose to impair
its verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation, towit:

wrap the body of Steven Roy James after his death in a pad

weighted by rocks and conceal the wrapped body by throwing it into
the Bear River.
b.

The crime was committed on or about August 26, 1993.

c.

The crime was committed in Cache County, Utah.

d. My conduct, and the conduct of any other persons for
which I am criminally liable, that constitutes the elements of the
crime charged is as follows:

2
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I knowingly and intentionally concealed the body of
Steven Roy James after his death on August 26, 1986, by
wrapping his body in a pad weighted by rocks and throwing
it into the Bear River at the Marina in Cache County,
Utah.
e.

I understand that the maximum punishment by statute

for the offense would be not less than one and not more than
fifteen (15) years in the Utah State Penitentiary and/or a fine not
to exceed $10,000.00, plus a 25% surcharge.
5.

I am entering the guilty plea or pleas voluntarily and

with the knowledge and understanding of the following:
a.

I know that I have the right to be represented by an

attorney and that an attorney or attorneys will be appointed to
represent me by the Court at no cost to me if I cannot afford one.
b.

I have not waived my right to legal counsel.

The

Court has appointed attorney Barbara King Lachmar and Arden W.
Lauritzen to represented me at no cost to me.
opportunity

to

discuss

this

statement,

my

I have had the
rights,

and

the

consequences of my guilty plea or pleas with my said attorneys
prior to the execution and filing of this statement and the entry
of my guilty plea or pleas before this Court.
c.

I know that I have a right to a trial by jury and

that a unanimous verdict would be required for a conviction on each
count before a jury.
d.

I know that if I elect to have a trial, I have the

right to confront and cross-examine any witnesses who testify
against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorneys.

I also

know that if I qualify as an indigent, I have the right to have my
3
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witnesses subpoenaed at State expense to testify in Court upon my
behalf.
e.

I know I have the right to testify in my own behalf

but that if I choose not to do so, I cannot be compelled to testify
or give evidence against myself and further that no adverse
inferences may or will be drawn against me if I elect to exercise
my right not to testify.
f.

I know that if I wish to contest the charge against

me, I may enter a plea of "not guilty" and the matter will be set
for trial. The State of Utah will have the burden of proving each
element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.
g.

I know that under the Constitution of the State of

Utah, if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by a Judge, I
would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the
Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, to the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah and that if I could not afford to pay the costs
for such appeal, those costs would be paid by the State as required
by law.
h.

I know that the maximum possible sentence may be

imposed upon my plea of guilty and that such sentence may be for
incarceration, fine, or a combination of both. I also know that in
addition to the imposition of any fine, a 25% surcharge as required
by §63-63a-1, Utah Code Annotated, will be imposed and that I may
be ordered by the Court to make restitution to any victim or
victims of my crimes,

4
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i.

I know that incarceration may be imposed by the

Court to be served consecutive periods.

I also know that if I am

placed on probation, parole, or am awaiting sentencing on another
offense in which I have been convicted or to which I have entered
a plea of guilty, my plea in the present action may result in
consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
j.

I know and understand that by entering a plea of

guilty, I am waiving my statutory and constitutional rights to file
an appeal.
k.

I know that by entering a plea of guilty, I am

admitting and do so admit, that I have committed the conduct
alleged and I am guilty of the crimes for which my plea is entered.
1.

My plea or pleas of guilty are the result of a plea

negotiation conducted between my attorneys, on my behalf, and the
Cache County Attorney or his deputy.

The terms of the plea

negotiation, if any, have been set forth in the plea agreement
filed with this Court together with this statement.
m.

I know that any plea negotiation is not binding on

the Court nor any promise or concession of the prosecutor to
recommend probation, suspended sentence, or reduced sentence.

I

also know that any opinions which they expressed to me as to what
they believe the Court may do are not binding upon the Court.
n. No threats, coercion, or unlawful or undue influence
of any kind have been made to induce me to enter a plea or pleas of
guilty and no promises other than as set forth in this statement or
the attached plea agreement have been made to me.
5
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6.

I have reviewed this statement with my attorneys and I

understand its provisions.

I know that I may change or delete

anything contained in this statement prior to my signing and filing
it with the Court.

I do not wish to make any such changes or

deletions.
7.

I have received legal advice and assistance from my

attorneys and am satisfied with such advice and assistance.
8.

At the time of the execution of this agreement and the

filing of the same with the Court, I was not and am not under the
influence

of any controlled

substance, drugs, medication, or

intoxicants. I am over 18 years of age and can read and understand
the English language.
9.

I believe myself to be mentally capable of understanding

these proceedings and the consequences of this statement and the
entry of my plea of guilty.

I am not undergoing any counseling or

treatment, mentally or medically, which would impair or prevent me
from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my pleas of
guilty or executing and filing this statement.
DATED this

3- day of

CKA*

* .

1993.

D

DEFENDANT

JJk^

a-

STEVEN RAY JAMEST~
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CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY

We, the undersigned hereby certify that we are the attorneys
of record in this matter for the Defendant, Steven Ray James; that
we know he has read the foregoing statement or that we have read it
to him and have discussed it with him; and that we believe that he
fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and
physically competent to execute it.
To the best of our knowledge and belief, after an appropriate
investigation, the elements of the crimes and the factual synopsis
of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated and these,
along with the other representations and diHl^rations made by the
Defendant in the foregoing statement, are accurate and true.
DATED this <^*" day of

thjUULAJ£^\wfo.

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
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CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the prosecuting attorney for the State of
Utah in this case against the Defendant/ Steven Ray James, and have
reviewed the foregoing statement of the Defendant and find that the
declarations, including the elements of the offense of the charges
and the factual synopsis of the Defendant's criminal conduct which
constitute

the offenses are true and

correct.

No

improper

inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea have been made
or offered to the defendant.

The plea negotiations are fully set

forth in the foregoing statement or the attached plea agreement or
have been supplemented on record before this Court.

There is

reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support the
conviction of Defendant for the offenses for which the pleas of
guilty are entered.

Acceptance of these pleas of guilty would

serve the public interest.

ROSEQUTING/ A'SZTORNEY
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ADDENDUM E

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE CC4JNTY^^gTSl^HT
STATE OF UTAH
Thira Judicial District

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

A M E N D E D
INFORMATION

AUG 0 2 1993

vs.

•"HTutv Clerk

STEVEN RAY JAMES,
DOB: 02-17-52

District Ct. No. 891900667

Defendant.

The STATE OF UTAH, upon evidence and belief, charges the
above-named defendant with the commission of the following public
offense:
COUNT 1:
CRIME:
IN VIOLATION OF:
CLASSIFICATION:
AT:
ON OR ABOUT:

Manslaughter
Section 76-5-205 U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
2nd Degree Felony
Cache County, State of Utah
August 26, 1986

The acts of the defendant constituting the public offense were:
That the Defendant, on the day and place aforesaid, did
recklessly cause the death of another, to-wit: Steven Roy
James.
COUNT 2
CRIME:
IN VIOLATION OF:
CLASSIFICATION:
AT:
ON OR ABOUT;

Tampering with Evidence
Section 76-8-510 U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
2nd Degree Felony
Cache County, State of Utah
August 26, 1986

The acts of the defendant constituting the public offense were:
That the Defendant, on the day and place aforesaid, believing
that an official proceeding or investigation was pending or
about to be instituted, did alter, destroy, conceal and/or
remove something with a purpose to impair its verity or
availability in the proceeding or investigation, to-wit: wrap
the body of Steven Roy James after his death in a tarp
weighted by rocks and conceal it by throwing it into the Bear
River at the Benson Marina in Cache County, Utah.

A A >> * i

This amended information is based on evidence obtained from the
following witness: Craig Andrews and Kevin Christensen
Dated: August

^- , 1993.
CACHE COUNTY ATTORNEY
By

Date Filed: August

<?C , 1993.
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ADDENDUM F

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUMggj Judi*# District

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs
STEVEN RAY JAMES,
Defendant.

SEP 1 0 1993
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
AND COMMITMENT *v
Case No. 891900667

3^5*^1

The above-named Defendant, having pled guilty to the following
offenses:
Count 1:

MANSLAUGHTER - a Second Degree Felony.

Count 2:

EVIDENCE TAMPERING - a Second Degree Felony; and

The Defendant, being present and represented by counsel and
there being no legal reason why sentence in this matter should not
be imposed; it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
Basic Sentence.
Count 1:
1.
The Defendant shall be imprisoned in the Utah State
Prison for a term of not less than one (1) and not more
than fifteen (15) years.
2.

The Defendant shall pay a fine of $10,000.00, together
with an 85% surcharge in the amount of $8,500.00, for a
total amount of $18,500.00 pursuant to Section 76-3201(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.

Count 2:
1.

The Defendant shall be imprisoned in the Utah State
Prison for a term of not less than one (1) and not more
than fifteen (15) years.

2.

The Defendant shall pay a fine of $10,000.00, together
with an 85% surcharge in the amount of $8,500.00, for a
total amount of $18,500.00 pursuant to Section 76-3201(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

002141

The Defendant shall pay restitution to Cache County in
the amount of $160,000.00.
2.

The Defendant shall pay restitution to Victoria DeLeon in
the amount of $750.00 for funeral and burial expenses for
the victim.

3.

This sentence for Count 2 of Evidence Tampering shall run
consecutively after the Defendant has served the sentence
for Count 1 of Manslaughter.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BOARD OF PARDONS:
1.

It is the recommendation of this Court that the Defendant
receive credit for time previously served of six (6)
years and eleven (11) months. (The Defendant has been
incarcerated at the Cache County Jail from October 23,
1986 until his sentencing, May 17, 1989. He was then
incarcerated in the Utah State Prison until November,
1991, when the case was remanded back to the District
Court on Appeal. At that time, he was returned to the
Cache County Jail where he has remained incarcerated
until his present sentencing.)

2.

It is further recommended that the Defendant be
considered for a mental health treatment program while at
the Utah State Prison.

CUSTODY REMAND
The Defendant is hereby remanded to the custody of the Cache
County Sheriff to be transported to the Utah State Prison.
Ordered this ^tJ

day of September, 1993.
BY THE COURT:

?££</£ /•'
AEPBOVED AS TO FORM:

ARDEN W. LAORI^ZEN
Attorney for Defendant

JENKINS
'Cache County Attorney

mm a*.

ADDENDUM G

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

LORENZO K. MILLER (5761)
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for the Utah Board of Pardons
160 East 300 South - Sixth Floor
PO Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Telephone: (801) 366-0100

OCT 2 5 1996
^JUJtu

By_

_

Deputy cic::. ^

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STEVEN RAY JAMES,
PETITIONER,

:
:
:

STATE OF UTAH and the UTAH
STATE BOARD OF PARDONS & PAROLE,
RESPONDENTS.

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND FINAL ORDER
Case No. 960903535 HC

:

Judge Pat B. Brian

This matter came before the Court on September 3, 1996 at
2:00 p.m., to consider Petitioner's Petition for Extraordinary
Relief and Respondents' motions to dismiss for payment of filing
fee and for failure to comply with the applicable statute of
limitations.

Petitioner was present and represented pro se. The

Utah Board of Pardons and Parole was represented by Assistant
Attorney General Lorenzo K. Miller, and the State of Utah was
represented by Assistant Attorney General David E. Yocom.
The Court, having thoroughly read all memoranda, documents,
and pleadings, having reviewed the law applicable to this case,
having heard oral argument from the parties, and being familiar
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with Petitioner's criminal proceedings, issued its decisions and
judgment.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court now makes the following
findings and conclusions.
MATERIAL FACTS
1.

Petitioner

Steven Ray

James, inmate

no. 19435, is

lawfully incarcerated at the Utah State Prison under a valid
judgment and commitment order issued by this court.
2.

Petitioner was arrested on October 23, 1986, and after a

jury trial he was convicted of Criminal Homicide, a capital
offense, and sentenced to serve life in prison.
3.

The Utah Supreme Court, however, reversed Petitioner's

conviction and remanded the case back to this court for further
proceedings.
4.

Subsequently,

through

a

plea

bargain

agreement,

Petitioner pled guilty to Manslaughter, a second degree felony, and
Tampering with Evidence, also a second degree felony.

In return

for his plea, the State dismissed the capital offense.
5.

After

a

lengthy

colloquy with

the

Petitioner, and

determining that his plea was knowing and voluntary, the Court
accepted Petitioner's plea and set the case for sentencing.
6.

On September 8, 1993, this Court sentenced Petitioner to

serve two indeterminate terms of imprisonment at the Utah State

2
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Prison, and it ordered that both sentences to run consecutively to
each other.
7.

From his arrest on October 23, 1986, until his second

commitment on September 8, 1993, Petitioner remained in state
custody and was not released from incarceration.
8.

On February 11, 1994, Petitioner appeared before the Utah

Board of Pardons and Parole for an original parole-grant hearing.
9.

At

that

time,

the

Board

calculated

Petitioner's

expiration dates as being October 22, 2001 (for the manslaughter
conviction), and October 21, 2016 (for the tampering conviction).
10.

These calculations were based upon the information that

Petitioner served approximately 2512 days prior to his September 8,
1993 commitment (e.g., from October 23, 1986 to September 8, 1993).
11.
officer

At the conclusion of the parole hearing, the hearing
took

Petitioner's

case

under

Petitioner an interim disposition

advisement

and

issued

form indicating the above-

mentioned expiration dates.
12.

On February 24, 1994, the full Board made its decision

and issued a second disposition form.
13.

This form incorrectly stated that Petitioner's expiration

dates were September 7, 2 008, and September 6, 202:3 which would be
the correct dates had Petitioner not been given credit for time
served prior to the September 8, 1993 commitment date.
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14.

Petitioner

never

notified

the

Board

of

the

miscalculations, but instead filed the instant action against the
Board claiming that his rights had been violated because the Board
was refusing to grant credit for time served as ordered by this
court.
15.

Subsequently, the Board reviewed Petitioner's claims and

determined that the disposition form, dated February 24, 1994, was
incorrect, and it corrected the clerical errors and issued a new
disposition form reflecting the corrections.
16.

The amended disposition form indicates that Petitioner's

sentences will expire on October 21, 2001, for the manslaughter
conviction, and on October 20, 2016, for the tampering conviction,
which is exactly 3 0 years

(minus three days) from the date

Petitioner was first arrested and placed in state custody for the
charged offenses.
17.

On September 3, 1996, Petitioner paid the $120.00 filing

fee required under section 21-1-5(1) (a) of the Utah Code Annotated.
18.

In addition to the claims against the Board, Petitioner

also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because he
allowed petitioner to plea to the tampering charge when the statute
of limitations for that crime had allegedly run.
19.

Petitioner asserts that he should not be forced to serve

the 1-15 year consecutive sentence for the tampering conviction
because he could not have been tried on that offense had he not
pled guilty.

0 0 018 0

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The first issue that must be resolved in this case is the
proper filing fee.

The Court has reviewed Petitioner's prison

financial statement, and based upon that record and Petitioner's
in court statements, the Court determines that Petitioner has had
and continues to have sufficient funds to pay a full filing fee.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner should pay the
statutory filing fee of $120.00 before proceeding with this
action.

However, in the interest of justice, the Court will

grant Petitioner until September 10, 1996 to pay the required
fee.

Payment in full by that date will be deemed timely by the

Court.
The second issue that must be resolved is Petitioner's
claims that the Board failed to grant him credit for time served
prior to his second conviction.

The record clearly indicates

that since Petitioner pointed out the error to the Board, the
Board reviewed its disposition and amended its Order to reflect
the proper expiration dates.
Because the Board has corrected its mistake in this matter
and has issued a corrected disposition form containing the
appropriate expiration dates, the parties are correct in
asserting that this issue is moot and there is nothing left for
the court

;

remedy • : >n these claims

Therefore, these claims

have been resolved and should be dismissed.

5
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As to Petitionees post-conviction claims, it appears that
these claims were raised for the first time approximately 15 days
after the statute of limitations ran.
35a-107.

See Utah Code Ann. § 7 8 -

From the record, it also appears that Petitioner was

incarcerated at the prison during the entire one-year period, and
therefore, the Court believes that Petitioner was unaware of the
limitation period imposed by the new Section 78-35a-107, having
neither constructive notice nor actual notice of the recent
legislation.

Furthermore, the Court does not believe that a 15-

day delay in bringing this type of action was unreasonable under
the circumstances of Petitioner's case.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that under the "interest of
justice" provisions of section 78-35a-107 (3), this case should
not be time barred.
Having determined that the statute of limitations found in
section 78-35a-107 does not bar the post-conviction claims, the
Court nevertheless concludes that Petitioner's claims should be
dismissed.

Here Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily entered

into an agreement with the State to plead guilty to one count of
Manslaughter and one count of Tampering with a Witness, and in
exchange for that plea, the State dismissed the capital charge
against him.

As a result of the plea agreement, Petitioner was

sentenced to serve two consecutive 15-year terms rather than a

6
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possible life sentence had he been convicted of the capital
offense.
In making the plea agreement, Petitioner waived any defenses
he may have had to the crimes to which be pled and he accepted
the judgment of guilty for those offenses.

Accordingly, the

Court concludes that Petitioner's plea of guilty to the tampering
charge waived any right Petitioner may have had to attack the
conviction, and he is therefore collaterally barred from seeking
habeas corpus relief at this time.
Finally, Petitioner claims that the Court failed to order
the statutory 85% surcharge when imposing the fine in his case,
and therefore, the State is barred from collecting that fee. The
Court concludes that Petitioner's position may have some merit;
and, therefore, the Court believes that the fee should not be
collected unless the Board of Pardons orders otherwise.

In that

event, the Board should file an objection with this Court.
Based on the foregoing, the court now makes the following
order:
FINAL ORDER
1.

The statutory surcharges that should have been assessed

to each of Petitioner's two $10,000.00 fines, shall not be
collected.

However, if the Utah Board of Pardons objects to this

order, the Board should file an objection with this Court, and
the matter will come back before the Court for final resolution.
7
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2.

The relief Petitioner seeks regarding credit for time

served has already been granted, making this issue moot, and
therefore, the relief Petitioner seeks is denied with prejudice.
3.

Respondent's Motion to Dismiss based upon the statute

of limitations contained in Section 78-35-107 is denied for the
reasons stated above.
4.

Petitioner's Post-Conviction claims are deemed to be

without merit, and therefore, the relief Petitioner seeks on
those claims is denied with prejudice.
5.

All other claims not specifically addressed herein are

also deemed to be without merit and are also denied with
prejudice.
6.

All issues resolved, this case is hereby dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this /fcfl day of September, 1996.
BY THE COURT:

k^.

HONORABLE T>AT B T - B T 5 —

Third Judicial District^Judcfe^.y"
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

k^l
STEVEN RAY JAMES
Attorney Pro £E

diL%>

IVID E. YO
Attorney fo

Ocgn\
e State

DATE

ZsSerr. IML,
DATE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this^g^r^day of September 1996, a
true and accurate, unsigned copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND FINAL ORDER was mailed, postage
prepaid, to:
STEVEN RAY JAMES #19435
UTAH STATE PRISON
PO BOX 250
DRAPER UTAH 84 020
and hand delivered to:
DAVID E. YOCOM
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E. 300 S.
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84114
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ADDENDUM H

ORIGINAL

FIRST DISTRICT COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

]

vs.

>

Steven Ray James, and any and
all others residing at
160 East 500 North,
Basement Apartment
Logan, UT
Defendant,

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

t

i

Criminal No*

The undersigned, under information
sworn, deposes and says:
That I,

Craig

Andrews,

have

and belief, first being duly
worked

Police Department more than twelve years.
as Sergeant in the
investigations.

Detective Division
I

have

areas of homicides and

received

their

for

the

Logan City

I am currently working .

in tharge

specialized

investigations.

f major crime
training in the
I

am personally

acquainted with the facts and circumstances of this case.
1 . That

your affiant was contacted by Steven Ray James, of

160 East 500 North, Logan, UT,

on

August

26,

1986.

Mr James

informed your affiant that:
a. That the defendant resides at 160 East 500 North, Logan,
UT together with Victoria DeLeon and their 3 month old
infant son, Steven Roy James, born on May 22, 1986.
b.
The defendant drove his vehicle, white over blue
cadillac, together with his said infant son to Osco Drug in
Logan, Utah at approximately 12:45 p.m. to secure spackling
compound to finish a home remodeling project.

t RIGINAL

c* The defendant left his said infant son in the vehicle
which was parked under a tree on 100 East between 400 and
500 North, just west of Osco Drug while he went into the
drug store to make his purchases*
When Mr* James left his
infant son, the baby was dressed in a blue t-shirt, had on a
disposable diaper, was wrapped in a white blanket with pink
and blue stripes* The baby, when last seen by the defendant,
was in an infant carrier with a bottle, in the front seat of
Mr. James' Cadillac.
Mr* James believes that the vehicle
was unlocked and the windows slightly open*
d* Mr* James returned to the car after a five to six
minutes and observed that the child was no longer in
the car* The defendant then stated he shut the car door,
went back into Osco Drug to the pay phone and dialed 911 and
reported the child, Steven Roy James, had been kidnapped*
2*
based on

Through your
the following

the manner described by

affiant's

investigation

it

appears that

reasons, the kidnapping did not occur in
Mr* James

and

that

Mr* James

was not

being completely honest in his account:
a* That according to various witnesses interviewed, the car
would have been under observation during most of the time
period beginning at 12:45 p.m on August 26, 1986, when the
defendant exited the car until he returned to the car
approximately five to six minutes later, when he discovered
the child
missing*
During
interviews
with various
witnesses, only one witness claimed to observe anyone near
or about the vehicle the child was removed from* Your
affiant, during the course of the investigation, was able to
eliminate this witnesses claim*
b*
That during various interviews with the defendant,
Steven Ray James, the defendant significantly altered his
accounts of the sequence of events which took place on the
morning prior to the kidnapping; specifically he initially
indicated that he had taken a bath between 10:00 and 10:30
a.m. and began working on the remodeling project in the
bathroom at approximately 10:00 to 10:30 a.m.
He later
indicated that he had taken his bath at 12:30 p.m* Still
later, he indicated that he had taken his bath around 10:45
to 11:15 a*m* and worked on the bathroom around 9:00 a.m.

3
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3.

The

defendant

indicated

defendant had been engaged
residence

located

at

in

160

engaged

I

painting

your

remodeling

East

500

included painting, and also during
been

to

his

affiant

the

that

bathroom

the

at his

North, Logan, Utah, which

that

same

previous

time

period, had

residence in Preston,

Idaho.
4.
-ad

On October 11, 1986, shortly before noon, the body

infant,

approximatel

months

nf

agt; „

t-shirt, and meeting the general description

of

of a

clad in a blue
the Steven Roy

James, was found vest of Logan at the Valley View Boat Dock.
body was wrapped in a cloth material having, what appears

The

to be,

paint spots and was tied with an orange electrical cord.
Because of

the aforementioned

facts and circumstances your

Affiant, believes that it is reasonable and prude n I I
defendant's residence
any paint or paint
and

all

other

and premises

related materials

evidence

which

\ e a i r I" i 1 1 • \

to ascertain the presence of
and similar

cords and any

may relate the defendant to the

crimes of Murder in the First Degree, Section 76-5-202,
U.C.A. 1953

as

amended,

and

Obstruction

of

Justice, Section

76-8-306, U.C.A. 1953 as amended, and or Tampering with Evidence,
Section 76-8-510, U.C.A. 1953 as amended.

Your affiant,

therefore, requests permission to search the
as 160

East 500

residence described

North, basement apartment, Logan, Utah together

with all out buildings, and vehicles controlled by the defendant,
Steven Ray James.

4
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5.

On

October 11,

1986, at

affiant talked with Victoria
Steven

Roy

James.

affiant to search the

Victoria

approximately 5:45 p.m., your

DeLeon, the
gave

residence,

the

mother of

verbal
garage

3 month old

permission
and

to your

the vehicles

located at 160 East 500 North, Logan, Utah,
DATED THIS 11TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 1986*

Craig R. Andrews, Sergeant
Logan City Police Department
SWORN TO BEFORE ME,
OF OCTOBER, 1986.

AND SUBSCRIBED IN MY PRESENCE THIS 11TH DAY
_, /
A

\
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ADDENDUM I

SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.

i

STEVEN RAY JAMES
DOB: 02/27/52
160 EAST 500 NORTH
LOGAN, UT
84321

i

Defendant,

OF ARREST

;

The undersigned, under
sworn deposes and says:
1*

AFFIDAVIT FOR WARRANT

information and belief, being duly

That your Affiant is Sergeant Craig R. Andrews, a Police

Officer employed by the Logan City Police Department for the last
thirteen years.
Investigations

That
and

your
serves

Affiant
as

is

currently

supervisory

assigned to

officer

of

this

Division.

That your Affiant has received specialized training in

the

i

area

homicide

investigations and that your Affiant has

personally investigated this case.
That your Affiant has probable cause to believe
or about

August 26,

the crime of Criminal
violation of

1986, the

Capital Offense.

The

above named defendant, committed

Homicide, Murder

Section 76-5-202
facts

that on

in the

First Degree, in

(l)(h), U.C.A. 1953 as amended, a
tending

» establish

grounds for

issuance of a warrant of arrest are as follows:

2.

On August ,,'fi

19 06! at.

I2I?I4

p.m., the Logan City Police

Department received a telephone report from Steven Ray James that
his three

month old male child had been taken from his car while

parked at Osco Drug on

<« *

in

Logan,

Utah.

That your

Affiant personally interviewed Steven Ray James on this same date
and received the following detailed report.
A* Steven Ray James stated that on August 26, 1986 around
1:00 p.m., he drove his 1972 White over Blue Cadillac to
Osco Drug to make a purchase of Dap putty supplies for a
home repair project he was working on. Accompanying Mr.
James at this time was his three month old son, Steven Roy
James, and the family dog, Rambo. Mr. James pulled into the
Osco Drug parking lot.
Unable to find a shaded parking
space, Mr. James pulled back onto the street and parked
under a shade tree at approximately 460 North 100 East. Mr.
James exited his vehicle leaving his son and family dog
inside. The vehicle was left unlocked and the windows
slightly unrolled for ventilation. Mr. James went into Osco
Drug, made a purchase and returned to his vehicle.
Mr.
James estimates that he was away from his vehicle four to
six minutes. Upon returning and opening the drivers door,
Mr. James noticed his baby missing from the front seat of
his vehicle. He stated he observed no one suspicious in the
area.
Still in the vehicle was the family dog, the child's
infant seat, and a baby bottle. Mr. James returned to Osco
Drug and made an emergency call to the Police Department's
Central Dispatch to report the disappearance.
B. Mr. James described his infant son as approximately
three months of age having been born on May 22, 1986 in
Preston, Idaho. The baby was a white male, weighing 12-14
pounds, 21 inches long, blue eyes, brown hair, with a red
birth mark on the back of his head.
The child's clothing
consisted of a disposable diaper and a medium blue pullover
t-shirt. Also missing with the baby was a multi-colored
white, pink, blue and yellow flannel receiving blanket. Mr.
James was questioned concerning other possible items missing
from the vehicle.
He reported that no other items were
missing from his vehicle.

3.

That over the next several weeks, hundreds of case leads

were received and investigated.
substantiate Steven James9 report
vehicle

while

witnesses were

it

was

parked

located that

that

anyone

had

entered his

at the Osco Drug store.

were in

none had observed an abduction.
be located who could confirm

No witnesses could be located to

the vicinity

Several

of Osco, but

Additionally, no witnesses could

seeing

the

child

during

the day

9

except

the

child's

mother,

Victoria DeLeon, who confirmed her

baby was alive and well when she had left for

work at

5:20 a.m.

on the morning of August 26, 1986.

4.

That as the investigation continued and Steven Ray James

and others were interviewed,
been

unemployed

over

the

it was

learned that

previous

five

months and that this

unemployment had placed a financial strain on Mr.
to

this

pressure

was

the

Mr. James had

James.

Adding

fact that Mr. James had outstanding

loans to financial institutions that he

was in

payment arrears.

At one time during this period, Mr. James' 1986 Suzuki motorcycle
was repossessed for non-payment of monthly loan obligations.
James additionally

Mr.

admitted to your Affiant, as well as the news

media, that he was and had been addicted to drugs for most of his
life.

His statements

were confirmed during interviews of known

friends and associates of Steven
review of

public arrest

well

as during

records and other documents.

Mr. James

had further admitted that
cocaine, was

Ray

his drug

ongoing until

James

as

abuse, including

the use of

just two to three weeks prior to his

sons disappearance.

5.

That Carol Bailey, an upstairs neighbor of Steven James,

at 160 East 500 North, was interviewed.

Carol stated that due to

a broken leg, she had spent a considerable amount of

time inside

her residence

During this

after the

James family had moved in.

time, Carol Bailey could hear the
On the

day the

James baby

crying frequently.

baby was reported missing, Carol Bailey was home

10

until

shortly

appointment*

after

10:00

a.m.

when

she

left for a medical

For at least one half hour prior to Bailey's

departure, she overheard the James baby constantly crying.
Bailey

stated

that

she

downstairs and help with

was
the

Carol

concerned and wished she could go
baby,

but

was

unable

to

do so

because of her broken leg.

6.

On October

11, 1986,

around 12:00

received at Logan Police Central Dispatch
dead body

believed to

be that

noon, a report was

of the

of a small infant.

reportedly found by hunters in the Little Bear
west

of

Logan.

Your

discovery of a

Affiant

The body was

River, five miles

responded to this location and

observed a small cloth covered bundle partially submerged

in the

river, four to five feet from the rivers edge.

A Mr. Kevin Homer

of Syracuse, Utah was

statement that he

had been

hunting with

interviewed and
relatives in

this bundle submerged in the river.

gave a
this area

Upon

and had observed

checking the contents,

he found what appeared to be the remains of an infant.

Mr. Homer

caused that a report be made to law enforcement authorities.
bundle

and

contents

were

secured

until

law

The

enforcement

authorities arrived.

7.
what

That your Affiant examined the cloth

appeared

observed that

to
the

be

remains

small

of a small infant.

infant

diaper, and a medium blue t-shirt.
small flannel blanket which

had

covered bundle and

was

clothed

in

Your Affiant
a disposable

The infant was covered with a
white,

pink,

blue

and yellow

JI

stripes.

The infant was additionally wrapped in what appeared to

be a white

mattress

visible paint
cloth.

cover*

This

splatters and

An orange

cover

had

several plainly

gave the appearance of a paint drop

electrical cord

was used

to bind

the bundle

together.

8.

On October

14, 1986, Victoria DeLeon came to the Logan

Police Department to observe items of clothing found
of a

small infant

Bear River.
blanket

discovered on

October 11, 1986 in the Little

Victoria DeLeon identified

and

the

blue

on the body

t-shirt

as

the multicolored flannel

being

her

missing child's

clothing.

9.

The remains of the

deceased infant

were transported to

the State Medical Examiners Office in Salt Lake City for positive
identification and determination of cause of death.
of

the

post-mortem

by

the

As a result

Medical Examiners Office and tests

conducted by the Logan Police Crime Lab and Utah State Crime Lab,
a positive

identification was made that the body was that of the

missing infant, Steven Roy

James.

The official

cause of death

was listed as a homicide.

10.

During the

that the Steven Ray
West, Preston,

course of the investigation, it was learned
James family

had moved

from 265

South 400

Idaho to Logan, Utah in early August, 1986.

during the move, bedding

items

residence had

to cover

been used

from

Steven

furniture.

Ray

That

James Preston

The bedding items

belonged to

a Don

Preston, Idaho.
used the

Lawhan, who was Steven Ray James' landlord in

Mr. Lawhan is

a painter

bedding as paint drop cloths.

by profession

and had

Mr. Don Lawhan had given

Mr. Steven James permission to use his bedding items on

his move

to Utah.

11.

On October 11, 1986, your Affiant interviewed Steven Ray

James* brother, Roy, who
related

that

confirmed
furniture.

he

using

had

resides in
helped

bedding

his

Logan, Utah.
brother

material-paint

move

drop

Mr. Roy James
to

Logan and

cloths

to cover

That these drop cloths had been borrowed from Steven

James' landlord in Preston, Idaho.
A. Mr. Roy James further related that approximately a week
or so following the reported abduction of Steven Roy James,
he and his brother, Steven, went to Steven's apartment, 160
East 500 North in Logan and picked up several of the paint
splattered items of bedding-drop cloths and took them to Roy
James* home where Steve was going to paint a bedroom.
B.
That on October 11, 1986, Detectives Jim Williamson and
Kevin Christensen of the Logan Police Department picked up
the paint splattered drop cloths from Mr. Roy James. That
the bedding drop cloths had paint splatters which were
visually identical to stains found on the bedding drop cloth
wrapped around the deceased infant, Steven Roy James.

12.

On

Christensen

October

obtained

12,

1986,

permission

Detectives

from

Williamson

and

Don Lawhan to search the

unoccupied home which he owned in Preston, Idaho.

This

was the

home that Steven Ray James had rented when he resided in Preston,
Idaho.

During the

cover which

search,

appeared to

the

Detectives

have been

used as

located

a mattress

a paint drop cloth.

13

The mattress cover was the same size, color, and had paint stains
which were visibly identical to the mattress cover

found wrapped

around the infant, Steven Roy James.

13.

On October

14, 1986, Detective Jim Williamson and Lab

Technician Dr. Kent Glanville interviewed Don Lawhan at the Idaho
State Crime

Lab in

Boise, Idaho.

Mr. Lawhan was shown several

items of bedding including the mattress cover-drop cloth found at
his Preston
and

the

residence, the bedding items received from Roy James

mattress

deceased Steven

cover-drop

Roy James.

cloth

found

wrapped

Mr. Lawhan positively identified all

the bedding items as his personal property which
his home

in Preston,

around the

Idaho.

he has

left at

Mr. Don Lawhan further stated that

he had three twin sized mattress pads which he used as paint drop
cloths where he lived in Preston, Idaho.
Idaho, he
The

took one

other

two

of the

were

left

mattress pads-drop
at

mattress covers would have been
that Lawhan

had given

move to Logan.
covers was

The

made based

When he moved to Boise,
cloths with him.

the residence in Preston.
included

in

the

These

bedding items

Steven Ray James permission to use on his
positive

identification

of

the mattress

on size, color, diamond padded stitching,

paint splatter stains, familiar wear, and other staining known to
Mr. Lawhan.

14.
known

as

Technician

That on October 15-17, 1986, using a scientific process
pyrolysis
Dr.

Kent

gas

chromatography,

Glanville,

matched

Logan

Police

Lab

paint splatter stains

-

i4

found

on

the

mattress

cover

Steven

Roy James was wrapped in

against paint splatter stains found on

the mattress

cover found

in Preston, Idaho, as well as blue paint samples removed from the
Preston, Idaho home owned by Don Lawhan and rented by
James,

The

paint

splatter

stains and paint samples from the

compared items were a positive match.
makeup of

Steven Ray

Additionally, the chemical

the fibers in the two mattress covers were found to be

identical.

15.

That your

background check
1952.

Affiant

has

conducted

a

criminal history

on Steven Ray James, date of birth February 27,

His record shows a criminal history of arrests for violent

crimes

including

aggravated
others.

arrests

battery,

of

drug possession, burglary, theft,

kidnapping,

child

abuse,

assaults,

and

Steven James* criminal history starts in 1963 at age 11

and extends into 1984.

There is currently an outstanding warrant

out of the State of California for felony probation violation and
two outstanding warrants

out

of

the

State

of

Washington for

theft.

16.

That

associated with
organization,

your
the

that

Affiant has learned through an individual
"Search

prior

to

for

Steven

the

Roy

location

James" volunteer
of

defendant Steven Ray James had discussed taking the

the

body, the

life of your

Affiant and then taking his own life.

f~
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17.

That on October 22, 1986, your Affiant received a phone

call from

Sue

Owen,

California Probation

a

probation

Department*

1973, Steven Ray James was
false imprisonment*

officer

with

She confirmed

sentenced

for

the

the

that in May of
felony

crime of

The felony conviction resulted from actions

of Steven Ray James in November of 1972 wherein Steven
arrested for

State of

the kidnapping

of an

James was

adult woman at gun point and

forcing her into a car.

18.

That your Affiant has

reviewed the

evidence and facts

of this case with the Office of the Cache County Attorney.
the opinion
cause

of their

has

been

Homicide, Murder

office and

shown

to

in the

of your

It is

Affiant that probable

establish that the crime of Criminal

First Degree,

Section 76-5-202 (l)(h),

O.C.A. 1953 as amended, a Capital Offense, has been committed and
further that the defendant Steven Ray
the murder

of Steven

James was

responsible for

Roy James and the attempted coverup of the

crime•

19.

Based upon

affidavit, a

the information

contained herewithin this

warrant of arrest is hereby requested to bring said

defendant before the Court.

It is further requested that

due to

the following factors, the defendant be held without bail:

r

i6

A.
The defendant is currently on probation for a felony
crime in the State of California and that a warrant for his
arrest has been issued.
B.
The defendant
probation.

committed

a

capital

felony while on

C. The defendant has made comments concerning death threats
against individuals involved in the investigation of this
case.

DATED this

n

day of October, 1986.

LLsj^in.

W

^

(jL{tf,j,«L~

Sgt. Craig^ft. Andrews, Investigator
Logan City Police Department

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this
1986.

2 3>

day of October,
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